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and Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν: Two educational ‘sessions’ (re)visited* 
Sophia Xenophontos 
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Introduction  
 
Πῶο δεῖ ηὸλ λένλ πνηεκάησλ ἀθνύεηλ and Πεξὶ ηνῦ ἀθνύεηλ1 belong to the 
wider group of Plutarch’s educational works. In fact they are considered to be 
among the essays which are most representative of Plutarch’s pedagogic 
convictions. The first reason that might encourage us to bring the two treatises 
into close correlation, and even suspect that they might be complementary, is 
the similarity of their titles, and most specifically the use of the same term 
ἀθνύεηλ. Even though we cannot be certain whether the titles are owed to 
Plutarch himself, the suggestion of the complementarity of the two essays is 
not unjustified. The second essay in particular is likely to have the title that 
Plutarch himself would have given or did give it, if we consider the first line of 
the essay itself, where ‘πεξὶ ηνῦ ἀθνύεηλ’ is explicitly stated: ‘ηὴλ γελνκέλελ κνη 
ζρνιὴλ πεξὶ ηνῦ ἀθνύεηλ, ὦ Νίθαλδξε, ἀπέζηαιθά ζνη γξάςαο’ (37C); and 
whoever gave the first work its title accurately reflected the emphasis of both 
essays, given the frequency of the word ἀθνύεηλ throughout. On the other 
hand, the issue of the dating of the two essays does not seem particularly 
relevant to the suggestion of their ‘companionship’. Although we cannot 
                                                          
* A version of this paper was delivered at the AMPAL Conference held by the University of 
Birmingham on 14-15 November 2009. I am particularly grateful to my supervisor, Prof. 
Christopher Pelling FBA, for reading an earlier draft of my manuscript and for offering many 
valuable remarks. But most of all I am thankful for his presence and active contribution to my 
own educational ‘session’.  
1
 The Latin equivalents of the Greek titles are Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat 
and De recta ratione audiendi respectively. For reasons of convenience the two essays will be 
referred to throughout the paper by the abbreviated form of their Latin titles De Audiendis 
Poetis and De Recta respectively. 
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determine fixed dates for their composition,2 nor even place them in 
chronological order, it is not that important which one was written first and 
which followed. What is important is how the two texts interact and illustrate 
their common Plutarchan provenance.  
 
The verb ἀθνύεηλ in the framework of the two essays acquires the specific 
meaning of not just ‘to hear something’, but at the same time ‘to understand 
and grasp the full implications of what one hears’.3 Therefore, Plutarch places 
a good deal of emphasis on the sense of hearing by regarding it as a major 
pedagogic tool which can enable students, young and more mature, to master 
the content of the subject taught to them. But what really distinguishes the two 
essays? Why are they not presented as one, since they are both interested in 
ἀθνύεηλ? In the two essays Plutarch deals with a different issue each time: in 
the De Audiendis Poetis he teaches the young man how he should study 
poetry, while in the De Recta he instructs a more mature student on how to 
attend philosophical lectures in the proper way. The presentation of these two 
related issues in two separate works offers us the opportunity to examine the 
two texts comparatively and draw certain metatextual conclusions. At this 
point, I should clarify that when I use the term ‘metatextuality’ I mainly refer to 
the way the interaction of teaching and learning has implications for how the 
texts themselves are functioning or may function.  
 
Scholarly approaches to the two texts present the following limitations. First, 
the De Recta does not seem to have received the attention it deserves; for it 
lacks any full treatment of its pedagogic background, and any interlinking with 
corresponding educational or moralistic ideas amplified in the rest of the 
                                                          
2
 Zadorojnyi 2002: 297-8, discusses the dating of De Audiendis Poetis based on textual 
indications; with further bibliography (note 5). Also Jones 1966: 117.  
3
 See LSJ s.v. ἀκούω: II.3. hear and understand, θιύνληεο νὐθ ἤθνπνλ A.Pr.448, cf. Ch.5, 
Ar.Ra.1173; ηὸ κὴ πάληαο πάλησλ ἀθνύεηλ S.E.M. 1.37. IV. understand, take in a certain 
sense, Jul.Or.4.147a; esp. in Scholl., as Sch.E.Or.333; τι ἐπί τινος Sch.E.Hipp.73. Note also 
that the particular verb can have the meaning of ‘be the pupil of’ (ἀθνύσ ηηλόο) II 4, which is 
revealing of the educational-pedagogic dimension that the word could bear.   
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Plutarchan corpus or even beyond that.4 Second, studies of the De Audiendis 
Poetis are mainly confined to analysis of its structure,5 to the association of 
the treatise with Platonic notions of paideia,6 or to the issue of the 
employment of poetic quotations in the essay.7 It is indeed surprising that 
such striking similarities between the two texts as those seen above have not 
led any scholar to examine them comparatively. The present paper aims to fill 
this gap and show that the two essays work complementarily on four levels at 
least, each level being treated in a distinct section of this paper. In the first 
section, I shall discuss the issue of the addressees of the two essays, which is 
important for how the pedagogic content of the De Audiendis Poetis prepares 
the ground for that of the De Recta. In the second section, I seek to explore 
the way in which poetry is presented as the preliminary stage of philosophy. 
The third section will touch on the correlation of the role of the poet and the 
philosopher as both being teachers of the young. The resemblances between 
poetic and philosophical mechanisms will be the subject of investigation in the 
fourth section. The interrelationship of the two texts on these four levels will 
reveal the manner in which Plutarch shows an obvious predilection for 
philosophy in relation to poetry. For, what we shall find stated in the case of 
poet – poetry – receiver/student of poetry in the first essay, we shall then be 
able to trace, but with substantial development, in the triptych of philosopher – 
philosophy – receiver/student of philosophy in the second one. This fits 
Plutarch’s general objective of highlighting the superior status of philosophy in 
comparison with every other kind of art/science; he himself after all considers 
philosophy to be the ‘ηέρλε ηνῦ βίνπ’ – the art of life (613B). Thus, we shall 
additionally in some cases cast an eye on Plutarch’s self-presentation as a 
philosopher, based on some common ground that is to be found between the 
                                                          
4
 The scholarly references to the De Recta are restricted to concise résumés of the content of 
the treatise in basic handbooks of the studies of Plutarch, e.g. Westaway (1922) 81-4. I 
discuss elsewhere the important connection between the De Recta and the De Profectibus in 
Virtute (DPhil thesis).     
5
 Schenkeveld 1982. 
6
 Zadorojnyi 2002; D’ Ippolito 1995; Hershbell 1995. 
7
 Papadi (PhD Thesis): 19-44; Carrara 1989; de Wet 1988: 16-7. 
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two essays and the Quaestiones Convivales. Finally, I wish to end this paper 
with certain concluding remarks and metatextual suggestions.        
 
Setting the Common Ground – The Addressees of the Two Texts  
 
One aspect that illuminates the relationship between the De Audiendis Poetis 
and De Recta is the different addressee of each essay. The first treatise is 
dedicated to Marcus Sedatus,8 who, just like Plutarch, is the father of a young 
man – ‘νὑκόο ηε ηὸ λῦλ Σώθιαξόο ἐζηη θαὶ ὁ ζὸο Κιέαλδξνο’ (15A). Plutarch 
offers Sedatus an aggregate of pieces of advice that he should keep in mind 
and try to pass on to his son so as to enable him to receive poetry in the best 
possible way, and thereby benefit himself. Plutarch is (self-)presented as the 
father of a son, which informs the way he instructs another father on how to 
initiate his son into the right way of listening to poetry. This becomes 
significant in four ways. First, the age of both dedicatee and dedicator – they 
must have been quite mature – helps to lend gravitas and prestige to the 
advice offered, since this is the outcome of experience acquired over a long 
period of life.9 Second, the fact that the advice is shared between two fathers 
gives the text a paternal quality, bringing out an intimate element in the 
anxiety that a father feels and should feel when it comes to the proper 
formation of his son’s character. As a consequence, there follows the third 
outcome, relating to the crucial role that a father plays in his son’s moral 
development.10 Fourth, Plutarch’s resort to turning to a father is an implicit 
                                                          
8
 Zadorojnyi 2002: 305 appositely contends that Sedatus (or Sedatius) may serve as a symbol 
of the fusion of the Greek and Roman world.  
9
 The mature age of both Plutarch and Sedatus is important due to its association with 
experience, a vital notion in Plutarch’s pedagogic thinking. In the An Seni, Plutarch stresses 
the significance of ἐκπεηξία as a didactic tool applied by the aged politician when he guides 
the younger one in the art of statesmanship. The pedagogic dimension of experience is an 
issue I treat in detail elsewhere.       
10
 Remarks on the paramount role of a father in raising his child are amplified in the De Liberis 
Educandis (although there are serious doubts about the authenticity of the essay). On this, 
see Albini 1997: esp. 63-6. For the role of the parental model in the formation of the son’s 
ēthos, see also Republic, 550a-b. 
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though tangible indication that the indirect recipient of the advice is indeed a 
young man, who most probably has not yet gained the maturity of thought 
needed to accept instruction without his father as an intermediary.  
 
In contrast to this, in the De Recta the age of the addressee has changed. In 
this case the whole set of advice is directed and applied to a young man who 
is now capable of receiving Plutarch’s advice directly, because he is more 
mature and experienced, having already assumed the toga virilis. The striking 
thing to note at this point is that Nicander’s transition to manhood and 
adulthood is marked by the retention of his sophrosynē and control of 
passions (37D-F), the very traits that Sedatus’ son, and by implication also 
Plutarch’s, still lack due to their youthfulness – we learn that they are 
impetuous and lively in everything (15B).  Therefore, Nicander, as a mature 
student of philosophy, possesses the self-contained disposition which 
Cleander, as a student of poetry and hence still a beginner in philosophy, 
does not yet have.11  
 
At the end of the De Audiendis Poetis Plutarch draws the conclusion that the 
young man who has been trained to listen to and understand poetry in the 
correct way is now qualified in advance in how to accept philosophy ‘in a spirit 
of friendship and good will and familiarity’.12 Therefore, we gather that poetry 
                                                          
11
 On the matter of the addressee of the De Audiendis Poetis, based on the structure of the 
essay, Schenkeveld 1982: 62, argues that the work is not ‘a theoretical dissertation’ but ‘a 
very practical guide for an educator and his son’, so that ‘the young boy also is expected to 
read this treatise’. I agree that the boy might at some point later in his pedagogic training 
come across the treatise, but I have hesitations in accepting that the essay is directly 
transmitted to both father and son. The mediation of the father in the address on the one 
hand, and the contrast with the De Recta case, which is straightforwardly directed to the more 
mature Nicander on the other, support my doubts about Schenkeveld’s view. Schenkeveld 
actually softens the assertiveness of his former opinion in the very last paragraph of his paper 
(71), where he abruptly claims that Sedatus could share the treatise with his son ‘after 
approval’. But does this ‘after approval’ not again presuppose a former stage of reading 
carried out by the father, and a second stage by the son?   
12
 All the translations are taken from the Loeb edition, in this case Babbitt 1927: Vol. I. 
Rosetta 8.5. http://www.rosetta.bham.ac.uk/issue8supp/xenophontos_plutarch/ 
169 
 
is a pre-stage that leads into the realm of philosophy – a propaideia for 
philosophy – ‘πξνπαηδεπζεὶο εὐκελὴο θαὶ θίινο θαὶ νἰθεῖνο ὑπὸ πνηεηηθῆο ἐπὶ 
θηινζνθίαλ πξνπέκπεηαη’ (37B). In the beginning of the De Recta Plutarch 
advises the more mature addressee on how to get down to the real stuff – 
philosophy – now that he is well-equipped: 
   
νὕησ ζε δεῖ πνιὺλ ρξόλνλ ἐλ θηινζνθίᾳ παξαηξεθόκελνλ θαὶ πᾶλ 
κάζεκα θαὶ ἄθνπζκα παηδηθὸλ ἀπ’ ἀξρῆο ἐζηζζέληα πξνζθέξεζζαη 
ιόγῳ θηινζόθῳ κεκηγκέλνλ, εὐκελῆ θαὶ νἰθεῖνλ ἥθεηλ εἰο θηινζνθίαλ 
[…] (37F). 
 
The tendency to speak of complementarity is strengthened by the fact that the 
close parallels cited above constitute the concluding passage of the one 
essay and the introductory passage of the other. What is more, the linking 
point of the two texts becomes obvious in these verbal similarities, which 
suggest that the two treatises could be considered as ‘companion essays’, 
and not just that they derive from a similarity of authorial mindset. Still, in the 
case of the De Recta the implications are traced even further, with the opinion 
that philosophy alone can array young men in the manly and truly perfect 
adornment that comes from reason – ‘ἣ κόλε ηὸλ ἀλδξεῖνλ θαὶ ηέιεηνλ ὡο 
ἀιεζῶο ἐθ ιόγνπ ηνῖο λένηο πεξηηίζεζη θόζκνλ’ (37F).  
 
Now that we have seen that the two texts indeed work closely together, we 
take this as our premise to move on and investigate their textual connection 
more deeply. As I have already mentioned, Plutarch’s major point in the De 
Audiendis Poetis is that poetry is a proper preliminary training, preparing the 
ground for one’s introduction to philosophy. The question that inevitably arises 
is why and in what way exactly does poetry become the pre-stage to 
philosophy. To put it differently, how do the qualities that poetry can offer in 
the De Audiendis Poetis resemble and anticipate the qualities that philosophy 
exhibits in the De Recta? And in what manner does the correct understanding 
of poetry on the student’s part in the one essay compare to the correct 
attention to philosophy in the other?  
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Poetry as a Pre-stage to Philosophy 
 
We may begin with the crucial point of the fusion of poetry and philosophy. 
Though an ardent Platonist in his philosophical thought, Plutarch did not follow 
blindly all Platonic convictions. On the contrary, he took the opportunity to 
alter his line from the Platonic School when he felt the need to do so.13 In the 
case of the two educational essays under examination we are confronted with 
an apt example of this divergence from Plato. Plato believed that there is a 
serious contradiction between poetry and philosophy, and justified his 
opposition to poetry on the grounds that the nature of its imitation was 
removed ‘three stages away from truth’ (‘ηξίηνλ ἀπὸ ηῆο ἀιεζείαο’, Republic 
602c). According to Plato, poets should even be excluded from the ideal 
society,14 since they describe the immorality of the gods by attributing to them 
human deficiencies and shortcomings.15 As a result, poetic narrations pervert 
the morality of humans and enslave young men to their passions and desires 
by diminishing their sophrosynē (self-control), a paramount element of aretē.  
 
Plutarch in the De Audiendis Poetis gives a rather different response to the 
extreme Platonic view.16 He does not accept that poetry should be abandoned 
                                                          
13
 Cf. Hershbell 1995: 210. Relevant to this is the suggestion of Plutarch’s philosophical 
‘eclecticism’. 
14
 Republic II and III (esp. 377a-398b). 
15
 Zadorojnyi 2002: 299-300, with full references to the Platonic works. Remember also 
Plutarch’s irritation about the way that poets annoy the audience with their naive accounts of 
the gods, Per. 39.2. On how Plutarch treats the role of music and poetry in the life of his 
statesman, see Bowie: 2004. Cf. also the exclusion of music and poetry from the symposium 
of the learned men, and the preference for discussions between the banqueters, in 
Protagoras 347de-348a. 
16
 Zadorojnyi 2002 interprets Plutarch’s stance towards Platonism in the De Audiendis Poetis 
by trying to reduce the contradiction between the two philosophers. He claims that Plutarch’s 
treatment is in fact compatible with the Platonic views and not so hostile towards his master’s. 
Zadorojnyi ponders the question of why Plutarch avoids mentioning the fact that Plato 
supported the banishment of poets from his ideal society, a point that he does not take as a 
coincidence (300); and he then distinguishes the two stages of the Platonic educational 
programme as expanded in the Republic, first the pre-reflective/pre-philosophical stage and 
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and, though he recognises the serious danger that the wrong study of poetry 
could cause to the young,17 he even then insists that students could derive 
real benefit from it. This could be achieved ‘ἂλ […] ηπγράλῃ παηδαγσγίαο 
ὀξζῆο ἡ ἀθξόαζηο’ (15C). In the course of this pedagogical process the role of 
the instructor is, of course, of paramount importance, since he is called to act 
as an ‘indispensable mediator’,18 so as to make sure that the artistic 
representation is being received by the student in the appropriate ethical 
manner. In an article which examines the Euripidean quotations that are 
integrated in the De Audiendis Poetis, Paolo Carrara argues that Plutarch is 
favourable towards poetry for the one and only reason that the study of the 
Classical poets constituted a basic part of his contemporary educational 
practice.19 No-one could deny that Homer and Euripides were broadly studied 
in the Greco-Roman world of Plutarch’s time;20 nevertheless, Carrara’s 
explanation would seem to be restricting Plutarch’s interest in poetry and 
reducing the stature of its employment to mere compliance with contemporary 
educational norms. Carrara’s view might have been reasonable if Plutarch 
had simply inserted Homeric and Euripidean material just for the sake of it 
without proceeding to a personal corroboration of their application and to the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
then the fully rational/philosophical stage (301). It is from the second educational stage that 
Plato excluded poetry, considering it as a rival to philosophy (302). Plutarch in the De 
Audiendis Poetis is dealing with this former, pre-reflective Platonic stage, of which a regulated 
form of poetry was still part, given that it remained subordinate to normative ethics (302-3).  
Plutarch’s reconciliation with his master could be also reflected in the non-coincidental silence 
that Plutarch maintains about poetry in his political essays. D’Ippolito 1995: 125 observes that 
Plutarch mentions neither the positive nor the negative function of poetry in statesmanship, 
and regards this as a ‘damnatio memoriae’.      
17
 ‘Wrong’ in the sense that it is misinterpreted and understood in the wrong way. That is why 
Plutarch proposes a proper manner of conceiving poetry.  
18
 Cf. Van der Stockt 2005: 141-2, who classifies the imitation encountered in the De 
Audiendis Poetis under the type of what he calls ‘passive mimēsis’, a category that owes its 
name to the lack of innate awareness of ethical calibre on the one hand, and to the lack of 
imperative repulsion from ethical ugliness on the other. According to Van der Stockt, passive 
mimesis is reasonably communicated via the authoritative presence of the instructor.  
19
 Carrara 1989: 450. 
20
 Morgan 1998: chapter 2. 
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establishment of a philosophical explanation for his choice. But is this the 
case? As I shall demonstrate below, Plutarch had a very rigid aesthetic and 
philosophic agenda while writing his two essays.       
 
When clarifying the nature of poetry,21 Plutarch states that the mythological 
core is the fundamental requirement in the production of high-quality poetry, 
since poetry is based on the fabulous and fictitious. In the framework of this 
explanation Plutarch strikingly employs the example of Socrates – the 
philosopher par excellence – and presents him as accepting that there is no 
poetic composition that does not rest on falsehood (16C). Through this use of 
the paramount philosopher, Plutarch provides some justification for the false 
element that is inherent in poetry and tries to show that poetic falsehood is not 
necessarily negative, since, as he says, mythological diction makes poetry 
more pleasurable. Plutarch concludes by proposing that poetry, with its 
mythological-pleasurable nature, could be combined with the ρξήζηκνλ and 
ζσηήξηνλ element of philosophy (14F).22 Therefore, prospective students of 
philosophy should not avoid poetry but consider it as a suitable testing-
ground, since they should be able to seek the profitable in the pleasurable, a 
quite difficult task, which examines the strength of their sophrosynē. In short, 
the Plutarchan student, if he succeeds in reading poetry in the correct way, 
then gains in essence a double profit: he first manages to enhance his self-
constraint and master the sentiments that poetry is liable to evoke in the 
audience, and he secondly embarks on philosophy having already pre-trained 
and tested himself in a rather challenging area. In this regard poetry is the 
preliminary examination taken by the student, in which, should he prove 
successful, he gains the ticket to the real ζπνπδή, philosophy.  
  
Plutarch, of course, is encouraging the view that philosophy should be mixed 
with poetic myth for the obvious reason that in this way learning becomes light 
and agreeable to the young – ‘ἐιαθξὰλ θαὶ πξνζθηιῆ παξέρεη ηνῖο λένηο ηὴλ 
                                                          
21
 For an impressive bibliographical accumulation of works on Plutarch’s aesthetic views, see 
D’ Ippolito 1995: 125-7, note 8.  
22
 See Klotz 2007: 657. 
Rosetta 8.5. http://www.rosetta.bham.ac.uk/issue8supp/xenophontos_plutarch/ 
173 
 
κάζεζηλ’ (15F). In the complementary essay De Recta Plutarch spends a 
whole chapter (ch.17, 47B-D) advising the student not to give up philosophy 
nor abandon its study due to the difficulty of the subject, but to persist and 
stick to the task until he is accustomed to it. He therefore acknowledges the 
‘harshness’ in studying philosophy and resorts to a practical solution which will 
extenuate and mitigate philosophical grandeur through the light use of myth. 
In this manner Plutarch intimates his own kind of philosophy which is aptly 
demonstrated in the First Problem of the First Book of the Quaestiones 
Convivales. Here, in examining whether philosophical discussions have a 
place in symposia, Plutarch suggests that philosophy should be present in all 
kinds of pleasurable activities and entertainment. The scholars (θηιόινγνη) are 
encouraged to mix philosophy with myths, so as to adapt the content of the 
conversation to the light atmosphere of the environment and at the same time 
to make the object of the discussion approachable to participants of all 
intellectual levels – both learned and non-learned should be able to follow 
(613D-E).  So, what Plutarch claims separately in the two educational essays 
is combined in the QC and presented as a whole – another indication of the 
complementarity of the De Audiendis Poetis and De Recta.  
    
That correctly comprehending poetry could be advantageous for the 
prospective student of philosophy is to be seen in the following: when, in 
Plutarch’s opinion, the receiver of poetry is aware of the fact that poetic 
production is based on imitation, then he can and should control the passions 
that arise from his emotional attachment to the κίκεκα (16E-F). Plutarch’s 
confidence that the alert reader will be able to detach himself from poetry’s 
negative effects is verbally communicated by his employment of the future 
tense (16E – νὐδὲλ πείζεηαη, νὐδὲ πηζηεύζεη, ἐπηιήςεηαη (twice), παύζεηαη, νὐθ 
ὀθλήζεη). What is more, this awareness of the reader would itself assume that 
the reader as well (and not only Plutarch) has accepted much of the Platonic 
argument, especially from Republic 10, dealing with the pre-philosophical 
stage of education from which poetry is not yet excluded.23 As for his 
                                                          
23
 This builds on the views of Zadorojnyi, discussed in note 16.  
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interpretation of mimēsis, Plutarch seems to be deviating from both the 
Platonic and the Aristotelian version of this. Plato held mimēsis to be an 
imitation of the ideal world (Republic II, III, X), whereas Aristotle associated it 
with literary representation (Poetics, 1447a 8-14448b 38, 1450a 19-21).24 
Plutarch is mainly following the Platonic line in his own definition of mimēsis 
but with the crucial difference that, contrary to his predecessor, Plutarch 
included a pragmatic element in his view of imitation; poetry is for him tightly 
connected with literary and philosophical paideia in the sense that he 
considers it feasible to be employed in real life and produce concrete results 
in the educational process. This is fully in accord with Plutarch’s pragmatic 
technique applied in the entire corpus of his work: in his Lives, Moralia, and 
Quaestiones Convivales the philosopher from Chaeronea is consistently 
interested in how his admonition will be fulfilled in his audience’s real lives.   
 
The effectiveness of sophrosynē against the delusive power of poetry which is 
described in the De Audiendis Poetis (taking the specific form of an artistic 
sophrosynē in this context) is reflected in the De Recta at a different level. 
Here Plutarch teaches the major importance of the student remaining still 
while the speaker presents his ideas; he should not react25 or be excited by 
his words even if he disagrees with him, but he should keep silent, show 
patience and respect, and hold back any objections until the speaker finishes 
(39C-D). This exhibition of sophrosynē suppresses the arrogance of the 
young and their philotimia. Furthermore, by listening cheerfully and affably 
(‘ἵιεσλ θαὶ πξᾶνλ’, 40B) and without envy to what is said, students could even 
                                                          
24
 On mimēsis, see Halliwell 2002.
  
25
 Note the verbal resemblance in the identical use of ζπληαξάηηεηαη: κὴ ζπληαξάηηεηαη κεδ’ 
ἐμπιαθηῇ πξὸο ἕθαζηνλ (40B-C) - ἂλ δέ πνπ ζπληαξάηηεηαη ηνῖο πάζεζη (16E). The idea of 
ηαξαρή contains important philosophical baggage, for it corresponds to the Epicurean 
formulation which recommended the abstention from political engagement for the sake of 
personal tranquillity. Ataraxia is for the Epicureans the freedom from any kind of worry and 
anxiety that is generated by interaction in political affairs. Sedley 1997 has discussed how 
different philosophical outlooks are found among the conspirators of Caesar’s assassination, 
with special emphasis on the Epicurean lack of ηαξαρή in that context. For the notion of 
ηαξάηηεζζαη in this, see esp. his pp. 44-7, with further bibliography (esp. note 31, p.46).   
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become imitators and admirers of the speeches and ideas produced through 
practice, hard training, and study. At a deeper level this patient and mild 
acceptance of what is presented can motivate the process of self-exploration 
by means of comparison between what the others said and what the listener 
would have said in such a case; in other words, as Plutarch urges, appositely 
quoting Plato, we should reach the point at which we should be posing 
ourselves the question ‘Am I not possibly like them?’ (40D).  
 
The Poet as a Reflection of the Philosopher 
 
Let us now cast an eye on the affinity between the role of the poet and the 
philosopher in the two texts. In the De Audiendis Poetis Plutarch mentions 
that since poetry is an imitative art it should be assessed by its degree of 
resemblance to the original. So, ‘since poetry often gives an imitative recital of 
base deeds, or of wicked experiences and characters, the young man must 
not accept as true what is admired and successful therein, nor approve it as 
beautiful, but should simply condemn it as fitting and proper to the character in 
hand’ (18B). The reference to the propriety which should be squared with the 
character that is entailed in a certain poetic passage was a fundamental ‘law’ 
(cf. the so-called principle of ἀπξέπεηα)26 in the method that Aristarchus of 
Samothrace employed, when he judged the authenticity of lines preserved in 
Homeric manuscripts of his time. Most importantly, Plutarch himself 
accommodates the propriety of character to his own biographical working 
method; for time and again in his Lives we find instances in which his 
arguments are constructed according to the coherence of the character of his 
subjects.27  
 
                                                          
26
 For instance, see sch. Hom. Il. 1.29-31; 9.46-7a1; 14.1a; sch. Hom. Od. arg. 3.73; arg. 
8.77. For aprepeia as a text-critical principle in Homer, see Xenis 2007: 108, 109. On the 
notion of propriety in ancient literary criticism and in Attic oratory, see DeWitt 1987 and Carey 
1999 respectively.     
27
 Duff 2008: 7, with additional references. Also Martin 1961: 337 (note 34).   
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To return to the statement in 18B, this helps Plutarch make his point that the 
poetic audience should not be influenced by the delusive nature of poetic 
presentations in general, and most specifically should not be led astray by the 
morally inferior characters that the poets themselves present as such.28 Thus, 
he provides the exemplum of Paris whose effeminacy in the field of battle 
Homer bluntly condemns. Afterwards follows the example of Menander who in 
the prologue of his Thais gives indications that he is aggrieved with his 
heroine’s behaviour. So, here we witness two poets who can act as 
paidagōgoi as it were, since through their personal judgments they give their 
own moral position and thus encourage their young readers and listeners 
towards moral elevation. They reveal their personal estimation of immoral 
deeds, and hence they show their concern for the morality of their subject.  
 
This could perhaps be taken as a fitting reflection of Plutarch’s method of work 
in his Lives. Throughout the vast biographical enterprise, Plutarch wishes to 
promote the morality of his audience by setting examples to imitate or to avoid 
and at the same time by projecting his own comments on the moral condition 
of his exempla. As we shall see later on, Plutarch’s self-presentation, 
especially in the proems of his Lives, gives him the quality of an instructor who 
directs the morals of his ‘students’ while concomitantly being himself improved 
as well. Moreover, poetic δηδαζθαιία becomes more explicit when in 19E-F 
we read that poets can offer καζήζεηο and that the poet actually δηδάζθεη, for 
instance in the case where Euripides punishes Ixion on stage. The 
philosopher in the De Recta seems to be a more advanced paidagōgos than 
the poet, since he proceeds much deeper into the task of improving the 
youth’s morality. He teaches them how to listen to many things but not say 
much (39B), without reacting to every word of their interlocutor, which means 
overcoming the predominant characteristic of youthfulness – lack of control. 
The philosopher also limits ambition, envy, enmity, arrogance, presumption, 
self-esteem, and accentuates patience, respect, self-exploration, and 
                                                          
28
 The distinction between ‘subject of imitation’ and ‘manner of imitation’ is treated also in 
Aristotle’s Poetics, 1448a 1-8.  
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affability. So both poet and philosopher advise and teach, though by 
employing different means – the former myth, the latter truth. 
 
Now a difference between the philosopher and the poet that might 
demonstrate the more vital pedagogic contribution of the former is the 
responsibility that the philosopher has to address specifically each participant 
in person and judge him, something that many times causes annoyance in the 
receiver, precisely due to the effectiveness of such a procedure.29 In this 
respect, Plutarch points out, philosophers in the schools are different from 
tragedians in the theatres (43E-F), who try to captivate the benevolence of 
their audience by cajoling them. This could be most probably seen as a self-
referential analogy that the philosopher Plutarch offers to himself, especially if 
we take into account the various ‘polyphonic and polymorphous’30 
philosophical personas that he acquires in the framework of the QC – all of 
which are to show that Plutarch’s main interest is ‘not just to stimulate 
emulation but also questioning, self-exploration, and most of all further 
discussion in readers’.31 Plutarch the philosopher is indeed concerned with 
the moral improvement of his ‘students’.  
 
But to be able to promote the ethical enhancement of his readers, Plutarch 
ought first to manage to establish some sort of rapport with them, which will 
open the channel of communication between author and reader. Stadter has 
brought out how Plutarch shares with his readers his own authorial 
preoccupations and expectations in the proems of his Lives.32 Interestingly 
enough, in the proem of Theseus Plutarch attempts to justify the mythical tone 
of his subject; he warns against its danger, but still assures his reader of ‘the 
                                                          
29
 In Gorgias 457c-458b Socrates distinguishes two groups of people, those who get sad and 
angry when are examined by the listeners, and those who accept the elegchos for their 
improvement. 
30
 Klotz 2007: 666. 
31
 Klotz 2007: 666. 
32
 Stadter 1988: esp. 283-7; Stadter also mentions the feature of Plutarch’s ēthos: 
‘understanding and intellectually curious person’, ‘aware of life in all its manifestations’, ‘he 
shares his feelings and assessments’, 292. 
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conscientiousness of his (the reader’s) guide’.33 Plutarch’s self-projection 
benefits his technique of building up an effective transmission of moralistic 
instruction in successive stages; as in the Theseus, in the De Audiendis 
Poetis Plutarch first elaborates the aspect of the mythical core of philosophy, 
he next recognises its pitfalls, but then highlights the significance of the 
author’s role in providing a sense of security for his audience. This role can 
also be attributed to the poets in the De Audiendis Poetis, who express a 
moral evaluation of the actions of their heroes and thus promote the upright 
morals of their readers.34      
 
Resemblances between Poetic and Philosophical Procedures  
 
The way that poetry’s mechanisms work, as they are presented in the De 
Recta, brings poetry into close similarity to philosophy. In the De Audiendis 
Poetis Plutarch suggests that the contradictions and disagreements among 
poets could be beneficial, because they offer the reader an opportunity to 
examine divergent opinions and choose the best one.  That is exactly how 
philosophy works. In the framework of a philosophical lecture, or better still a 
philosophical discussion, the opposing philosophical speeches encourage the 
quest for the best opinion, which is closest to truth and the most capable of 
leading people to moral goodness. This is after all why Plutarch in the De 
Recta places so much emphasis on the ability of the listener to accept 
patiently all the opinions before taking his own position towards them. To take 
my point further, Plutarch’s emphatic preference for the examination of 
contradictory opinions on every topic can be seen in action in his way of 
developing the philosophical dialogues in the QC. For instance, in Problem 2 
Book 1 Plutarch is the judge of an agōn between his brother and his father on 
the issue of whether the host should arrange the placing of his guests or not. 
                                                          
33
 Stadter 1988: 284. 
34
 Russell 1993: 427 similarly claims that ‘both Plutarch and Horace seek to help their 
readers, as well as to advance their own case, by talking sometimes about themselves’; see 
also 436.   
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Likewise in Problem 4 Book 1 Crato and Theon express opposing beliefs 
while pondering the question of the symposiarch’s conduct.  
 
Another aspect that might disclose the similar function of poetry and 
philosophy is the common procedure of receiving another person’s ideas, 
either a poet’s or a philosopher’s, and specific content, either poetic or 
philosophic, through oral reception (ἀθνύεηλ). The implications are important 
especially in the case of philosophy, since a high proportion of the educational 
responsibilities when it comes to philosophical lectures fall to the listener 
himself, who has to be pre-trained and practised before entering the lecture-
room. Thus, philosophy appears to be a much more serious and laborious 
area of study than poetry. Nicander in the De Recta has already gained deep 
experience in philosophy and he is thus properly equipped to move on to his 
philosophical education (37F), whereas in poetry the young man could have 
no specific background (without being κεκειεηεκέλνο, 16A), but still be able to 
understand poetry. 
 
A further similarity between a poetic and philosophical mechanism is the 
following: in cases where the things said in poems seem to be ἄηνπα and 
without obvious solution, we should try to find contradictory opinions set out 
by the same poet on the same issue to offset the immoral passage. This is the 
so-called procedure of ἐπαλόξζσζηο,35 according to which certain poetic 
words, phrases, or passages are amended to suit the moralistic agenda of the 
author who is employing them. Notice though that the things that are ἄηνπα 
are those which are liable to cause ἀπνξία, the basic element to induce a 
philosophical discussion.36 But ἀπνξία in its turn forms the basis of Socrates’ 
                                                          
35
 Papadi (PhD thesis) 33, proposes the interesting connection between poetic ἐπαλόξζσζηο 
in Plutarch’s De Audiendis Poetis (21B; 33C-D) and moralistic ἐπαλόξζσζηο in the 
programmatic prologue of Aem. 1. 4.     
36
 Plato Theaet. 155d; Also Aristotle Metaph. 982
b
14: δηὰ γὰξ ηὸ ζαπκάδεηλ νἱ ἄλζξσπνη θαὶ 
λῦλ θαὶ ηὸ πξῶηνλ ἤξμαλην θηινζνθεῖλ, ἐμ ἀξρῆο κὲλ ηὰ πξόρεηξα ηῶλ ἀηόπσλ ζαπκάζαληεο. 
Plutarch himself holds that the ζαπκαζηόλ is the key-element for the genesis of philosophical 
discourse, 680C-D; 734D. 
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midwifery method37 – when examining his interlocutor, Socrates aimed to 
produce ἀκεραλία in him, in order to show him that he is wrong and thus to 
make him realise that the knowledge that he hitherto held on a specific issue 
was insufficient. He managed this by posing certain questions of the type ‘You 
are saying that A is like this, right?’, ‘But you yourself just previously and a 
moment ago said that A was otherwise! So you are contradicting yourself’.38 
The philosophical way to discover truth is through tracing contradictions, a 
method that Plutarch applies in the case of poetry as well. 
 
Similarly, an examination of the subtle meanings of words in specific contexts 
when studying poetry and an awareness of the various connotations of a term 
that can give a better and more ὠθέιηκνλ interpretation can be employed 
against a philosophical background. For philosophical discussions, and 
particularly Platonic ones, are marked by the procedure of clarifying the 
specific meaning with which a term is used, especially when it comes to 
abstract morally-oriented words, such as ἀγαζόλ-θαθόλ, ὠθέιηκνλ-βιαβεξόλ, 
δίθαηνλ-ἄδηθνλ. In each case the interlocutors in a philosophical discussion 
specify how and with what meaning they colour the term they are using.  
 
Conclusion 
 
                                                          
37
 Plutarch elaborates Socrates’ midwifery method and its connection with the Platonic theory 
of pre-existing knowledge (anamnēsis) in his Platonic Questions, 1000D-E. 
38
 A vivid example of this is to be found for instance in 453b-c of the Republic. Here Socrates 
disputes with Glaucon on the difference between men and women, and shows him the 
procedure for tracing self-contradictions: ‘There’s nothing to stop us.’ ‘All right. Let’s speak for 
them. ‘‘Socrates and Glaucon, there’s no need for anyone else to challenge you. You 
yourselves agreed, when you first started founding your city, that in the natural order of things 
each individual should carry out one task, the one for which he was fitted.’’’ ‘Yes, I think we 
did agree that. How could we disagree?’ ‘‘‘Can you deny that a woman’s nature is completely 
different from a man’s?’’’ ‘No. Of course it’s different.’ ‘‘‘In that case, shouldn’t each also be 
assigned a task appropriate to his or her nature?’’’ ‘Of course.’ ‘‘‘Then you must be wrong 
now. You must be contradicting yourselves when you say that men and women should 
perform the same tasks, despite having widely different natures.’’’ [transl. Tom Griffith 2000]. 
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Before we end let us make the following concluding remarks. Plutarch in his 
De Audiendis Poetis and De Recta amplifies his pedagogic beliefs. He 
manages in two distinct treatises to give his own answer and alternative to the 
Platonic conviction that so utterly separated poetry from philosophy. Although 
he presented each ζπνπδή in a separate context, nevertheless the close 
affinities between poetic and philosophic aspects on the one hand, and the 
parallelisms in the way that poet and philosopher can appear as both 
paidagōgoi on the other, offer sufficient evidence to show that the two essays 
complement one another, so as to produce Plutarch’s united and solid 
opinion. For in Plutarch’s mind poetry constitutes a microcosm of philosophy. 
Should we correlate the two texts, we get a full picture of how Plutarch 
reconciled poetry and philosophy with the aim of achieving the moral 
improvement of his audience. 
 
My final paragraph will concentrate on a thought-provoking metatextual 
suggestion that could be added as the corollary of the whole discussion in this 
paper. I have already argued throughout that the two texts work 
complementarily; the young student of De Audiendis Poetis receives 
instruction in how to employ the study of poetry in the most beneficial manner, 
so as to prepare himself for his introduction to philosophy. The more mature 
recipient of the De Recta must have already acquired the poetic advice of the 
De Audiendis Poetis as he is now an initiated student of philosophy. In light of 
this, we could claim that, since the De Audiendis Poetis is embodying a 
specific sort of guiding advice, this guidance could have been a textual 
equivalent of what the more experienced student in the De Recta must have 
acquired. In other words, the De Audiendis text gains a living existence in the 
De Recta environment as the textbook that Nicander would have taken as a 
reminder of his earlier pedagogic grounding in poetry. He could thus take 
advantage of the presence of his previous pedagogic handbook and evaluate 
his own progress by comparing his former stage of pedagogy to his current 
one. In like manner the De Recta textbook with its more advanced 
philosophical material, if transferred to the De Audiendis Poetis environment, 
could prefigure, for both Sedatus and Cleander, how each of their sons’ future 
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educational state would develop after he had received proper poetical 
instruction. The De Recta text offers a reflection of the results of poetic study. 
The two works are metatextually interwoven and vindicate their textual 
presence, with the one moving into the domain of the other.39 
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